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Abstract 
A Runway Incursion Prevention System 
(RIPS) was tested at the Dallas-Ft. Worth 
International Airport (DFW) in October 2000.  The 
system integrated airborne and ground components 
to provide both pilots and controllers with enhanced 
situational awareness, supplemental guidance cues, 
a real-time display of traffic information, and 
warning of runway incursions in order to prevent 
runway incidents while also improving operational 
capability.  A series of test runs was conducted 
using NASA’s Boeing 757 research aircraft and a 
test van equipped to emulate an incurring aircraft.  
The system was also demonstrated to over 100 
visitors from the aviation community.  This paper 
gives an overview of the RIPS, DFW flight test 
activities, and quantitative and qualitative results of 
the testing. 
Introduction 
A runway incursion occurs any time an 
airplane, vehicle, person or object on the ground 
creates a collision hazard with an airplane that is 
taking off or landing at an airport under the 
supervision of air traffic control (ATC) [1].  Despite 
the best efforts of the FAA, National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) and others, runway 
incursions continue to occur more frequently.  The 
number of reported incursions rose from 186 in 
1993 to 431 in 2000, an increase of 132 percent.  In 
addition, there were 166 incursions during the first 
five months of 2001, compared with 158 during the 
same period in 2000.  Runway incursions continue 
to be a serious aviation safety hazard, and have 
been listed on the NTSB’s ten most wanted list of 
transportation safety improvements every year since 
its inception in 1990 [2].  The NTSB has also made 
a specific recommendation that the FAA require, at 
all airports with scheduled passenger service, a 
ground movement safety system that provides direct 
runway incursion warning capability to the flight 
crews [3]. 
The FAA has been developing a runway 
incursion alerting system for ATC since the early 
1990s.  Any alerts generated by this system would 
be relayed to flight crews by ATC via voice 
communications.  Currently, there is no system 
available on-board aircraft to provide the flight 
crew with surface situational awareness information 
or timely alerts of potential runway conflicts.   
As described in [4], the key to preventing 
runway incursions is to ensure that pilots know: 
? ? Where they are located 
? ? Where other traffic is located 
? ? Where to go on the airport surface 
In the event an incursion still occurs, by pilots 
not knowing the above, the flight crew and ATC 
should be alerted to the situation. 
A Runway Incursion Prevention System 
(RIPS) has been developed to provide this 
knowledge in all visibility conditions.  RIPS 
integrates airborne and ground-based technologies, 
which include flight deck displays, incursion 
alerting algorithms, on-board position 
determination systems, airport surveillance systems, 
and controller-pilot data link communications.   
The RIPS concept was tested at DFW in 
October 2000.  The objectives of the testing were to 
assess and validate technology performance and to 
demonstrate the system in an operational 
environment.  RIPS is based upon a previous 
system that was designed to improve the safety and 
efficiency of aircraft movements on the airport 
surface [4][5][6][7]. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20070031758 2019-08-30T01:36:21+00:00Z
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System Description 
The RIPS research system as tested at DFW 
consisted of several subsystems that were installed 
at the following four locations: 
? ? NASA’s Boeing 757-200 research 
aircraft (B-757) outfitted with a research 
display system on the left side of the 
fight deck and other required systems aft 
of the flight deck 
? ? A test van equipped with an Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
(ADS-B) Mode S transponder, Air 
Traffic Control Radio Beacon System 
(ATCRBS) transponder, Universal 
Access Transceiver (UAT) data link and 
differential Global Positioning System 
(GPS) to emulate an aircraft and interact 
with the B-757 during the test scenarios 
? ? The east side of the DFW airport 
equipped with a prototype surveillance 
system developed by the FAA’s Runway 
Incursion Reduction Program 
? ? A ground station located at a hotel north 
of the DFW airport that contained an 
ATC workstation, a GPS reference 
system, and video and data telemetry 
equipment 
The RIPS subsystems are described below. 
Research Display Subsystem 
The RIPS research flight deck displays were 
generated using a DFW airport geographic database 
[8] and inputs from position determination 
subsystems.  The database was developed based on 
the requirements specified in [9]. 
A Head-up Display (HUD) was mounted in 
front of the left seat position of the B-757.  The 
HUD was used for monitoring during final 
approach and tactical guidance during roll-out, turn-
off, and taxi [10].  Symbology presented during 
landing was similar to that used by commercial 
HUD vendors and was implemented solely to show 
how this guidance could transition to surface 
guidance.  During landing roll-out, deceleration 
guidance to a pilot-selected exit was provided along 
with centerline and runway edge symbology.  
During taxi, centerline and taxiway edge symbols 
were provided along with centerline tracking 
guidance to a gate location (Figure 1).  An 
additional capability during landing roll-out, was 
guidance to a hold-short point on the runway.  All 
of the above were provided to enable all weather 
capability while reducing the likelihood of runway 
incursion by improving position awareness. 
 
Figure 1.  HUD Symbology During Taxi 
An Electronic Moving Map (EMM) was 
displayed on the multifunction display when 
selected by the pilot.  The EMM showed the airport 
layout graphically along with current position of the 
ownship, current positions of other traffic, and ATC 
instructions (Figure 2).  Several zoom/scale levels 
were available to pilots.  ATC instructions received 
via data link were depicted both graphically and 
textually.  The text messages were shown on a pop-
up window that the pilot could remove if desired.  
Graphic depictions of ATC instructions included 
the approved route and any hold-short locations.  
Finally, any runway intersection that was ahead of 
high-speed runway traffic was highlighted to warn 
taxiing pilots of this situation.  The EMM was 
provided to enable all weather capability while 
reducing the likelihood of runway incursion by 
improving awareness of position, traffic, and 
routing constraints.  
Runway Incursion Alerting 
At DFW, a runway was monitored for a  
runway incursion anytime the ownship was to enter 
the runway, e.g. during final approach and landing, 
takeoff roll, and taxi crossing.  If an incursion 
occurred, alerts were provided to the flight crew.  
The alerts were generated by three methods: 
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Figure 2.  Electronic Moving Map 
 
? ?  Runway Safety Monitor (RSM) 
? ?  Runway Incursion Advisory and 
Alerting System (RIAAS) 
? ?  Ground Based System (GBS) 
The RSM onboard incursion detection 
algorithm [11] took a generic approach for 
generating incursion alerts and was not designed for 
specific incursion scenarios.  The RSM monitored 
traffic that entered a three-dimensional virtual 
protection zone around a runway that was being 
used by the ownship.  The protection zone extended 
1.1 nautical miles from the runway threshold, 220 
feet from the edges of the runway, and 400 feet 
vertically.  Detection of incursions was based on the 
operational state of the ownship and traffic and 
other criteria (separation and closure rate) to avoid 
false alerts.  The identification, position, and 
altitude data was used to track the traffic in the 
protection zone.  Velocity and heading information 
was calculated from position reports since the data 
provided by the surveillance system was not 
reliable.  RSM generated Runway Conflict Alerts 
(RCA) (see below for definition).   
The RIAAS onboard alerting algorithm 
[12][13] worked on the same general premise as the 
RSM, utilizing runway zones and tracking of traffic 
within that zone.  However, RIAAS differed from 
RSM as follows.  RIAAS issued alerts based on the 
states of ownship and traffic and criteria associated 
with specific scenarios.  State was determined by 
the location relative to the runway, speed, track 
angle, and acceleration.  RIAAS was designed to 
handle over forty specific runway incursion 
scenarios.  RIAAS generated two types of alerts 
that are analogous to the Traffic Alert and Collision 
Avoidance System (TCAS) approach.  A Runway 
Traffic Alert (RTA) cautioned the flight crew of a 
potential incursion or an incursion where the 
conflict did not yet require evasive action.  The 
crew could take evasive action, however, at their 
discretion.  An RCA occurred when an actual 
runway incursion was detected and an evasive 
action was required to avoid a potential collision.   
The FAA ground-based surveillance system 
generated alerts of potential collisions on runways 
based on a subset of scenarios used by the Airport 
Movement Area Safety System (AMASS).  
AMASS is designed to alert air traffic controllers of 
surface conflicts.  The safety logic was only applied 
to traffic that was on the runway or in its approach 
corridor.  Alerts were generated when two targets 
fell within a separation distance threshold.  These 
GBS alerts were transmitted to the B-757 as Flight 
Information Services – Broadcast (FIS-B) messages 
over a UAT data link [14].  GBS generated RCA 
alerts. 
These three methods are currently designed to 
provide only alerting to the flight crew.  Maneuver 
guidance for taking evasive action is not provided. 
The alerts were presented to the flight crew 
both visually (on the HUD and EMM) and audibly.  
For a RTA, an audible enunciation of the phrase 
“Runway Traffic, Runway Traffic” was made in the 
flight deck.  The textual form of this alert was 
presented on both the HUD and the EMM (in 
yellow).  On the EMM, the traffic symbol 
representing the incurring aircraft/vehicle changed 
color (yellow).  For a RCA (Figure 3), “Runway 
Conflict, Runway Conflict” was used for the 
audible alert.  The textual form of this alert was 
presented on the HUD and the EMM (in red).  On 
the EMM, the traffic symbol representing the 
incurring aircraft/vehicle changed color (red).  For 
both a RTA and RCA, information was added 
beneath the ownship symbol and on the HUD 
indicating the distance to the incurring traffic and 
time until potential collision at present conditions.  
The identification tags were also highlighted. 
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Figure 3.  Incursion Alerting Flight Deck Displays 
Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications 
A Controller-Communication and Situational 
Awareness Tool (C-CAST) enabled Controller-Pilot 
Data Link Communications (CPDLC).  C-CAST 
was designed to provide improved situational 
awareness to ATC [15].  A test controller was 
shown a graphic display of DFW overlayed with 
real-time airport traffic and identification (Figure 
4).  The test controller monitored DFW ATC.  Any 
instructions for the research aircraft were spoken by 
the test controller into the C-CAST voice 
recognition system [16].  C-CAST also had touch 
screen capability.  Instructions were encoded into 
ICAO Aeronautical Telecommunications Network 
(ATN) type messages and transmitted to the B-757 
via VHF data link (VDL)-Mode 2 for display in the 
flight deck [17]. 
In addition, runway incursion alerts generated 
on-board the B-757 were sent to the C-CAST via 
the same two-way VDL Mode 2 data link for 
display to the controller.  The alerts generated by 
the GBS were also displayed on C-CAST. 
Route deviations were detected by RIPS on the 
B-757 if the aircraft left its assigned path during 
taxi.  Route deviation alerts were data linked to C-
CAST so that corrective action could be taken 
before the blunder lead to an incursion. 
 
Figure 4.  C-CAST Display 
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Position Sources 
Ownship Position Determination 
A Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) 
was installed at DFW to support both surveillance 
and guidance functions [18][19].  The LAAS 
consisted of four independent GPS reference 
receivers on the airport to monitor the performance 
and health of the GPS signal.  LAAS differential 
corrections were transmitted to the B-757 over a 
VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) data link.   
Throughout most of the RIPS testing, LAAS 
position blended with inertial navigation system 
(INS) data was used for ownship position 
determination.  In instances where the LAAS data 
was deemed inaccurate, differentially corrected 
position information from an AshTech GPS system 
with its own reference receiver was used. 
A Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) 
receiver was also installed on the research aircraft.  
The WAAS is based on a network of approximately 
25 ground reference stations located throughout the 
United States.  Differential corrections are 
broadcast using satellites.  The WAAS data was 
recorded onboard the research aircraft for post test 
analysis and was not used for real-time positioning 
during the RIPS testing. 
Traffic Position Determination 
RIPS used two methods of acquiring traffic 
position data onboard the research aircraft: ADS-B 
and Surface Traffic Information Services – 
Broadcast (STIS-B).  The STIS-B data was sent 
from the ground system and is described in the 
Surveillance System section below. 
ADS-B is a method of broadcasting data 
between aircraft and surface vehicles directly, 
without the use of ground-based equipment.  For 
RIPS, ADS-B messages were broadcast from the 
research aircraft and test van at 1090 MHz using the 
Mode S extended squitter format.  The messages 
contained position, altitude, speed, heading, 
air/ground status, navigation uncertainty, flight 
identification, aircraft ICAO address, and aircraft 
type.  The position information was obtained from a 
GPS receiver using LAAS differential corrections.  
Position messages were transmitted at a normal rate 
of twice per second.  [19] 
Surveillance System 
The FAA RIRP installed an experimental 
surveillance system at DFW [20][21].  This system 
acquired information on traffic in the airport 
terminal area from several sources, fused this 
information, and then transmitted this traffic data to 
the NASA research aircraft. 
The Airport Surface Detection Equipment 
(ASDE-3) radar captured position data (range and 
azimuth) at a 1 Hz rate for all aircraft or vehicles 
operating on the airport surface movement area.  
ASDE-3 does not require any equipage on aircraft 
or vehicles.  It operates in the Ku-band (15.7 – 16.2 
GHz) and penetrates rain, snow, and fog to provide 
controllers with a high-resolution display of airport 
traffic.  Although the ASDE-3 is a high 
performance radar system, it still has certain 
limitations.  Complete airport surface coverage is 
not achieved with the ASDE-3 alone since it is a 
line-of-sight radar.  False targets can be reported 
from multi-path reflections.  Also, the ADSE-3 
does not report target identification information. 
An Airport Target Identification System 
(ATIDS) was installed on the east side of the DFW 
airport.  ATIDS is a multilateration system designed 
to track and provide identification information for 
aircraft and ground vehicles with operating 1090 
MHz ADS-B, Mode S, and ATCRBS transponders.  
The ADS-B transmissions from the research aircraft 
and test van were also captured by ATIDS.   
A surveillance server provided position reports 
from the ASDE-3 radar and ATIDS, as well as, 
other ATC radar systems and taxiway sensor 
technology.  These sources of position data were 
fused to provide seamless surveillance of the airport 
surface.  These fused reports were sent to a data 
link manager to be packaged for transmission over 
the UAT RF data link (966 MHz) [14].  The UAT 
broadcast STIS-B messages to the B-757.  The 
traffic data was also provided to the C-CAST via a 
local area network for display to the controller. 
Flight Test Operations 
The deployment to DFW occurred during 
September and October 2000.  This testing included 
a check-out period, data collection period, and 
demonstration period. 
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Test Scenarios 
There were four scenarios tested at DFW as 
described below.  For each scenario, the test pilot 
was not required to take evasive action when a RTA 
was issued. 
Scenario 1 
The B-757 aircraft was landing with autoland 
engaged while the test van was located behind the 
hold line at a taxiway near the runway threshold.  
When the aircraft was approximately one nautical 
mile from the threshold, the test van began crossing 
the runway.  The pilot was required to perform a 
go-around when either a RCA was issued or the 
aircraft reached 150 ft. above ground level (AGL).  
The test van continued across the runway. 
Scenario 2 
This was a departure scenario.  Initially, the 
test van was located behind the hold line at a 
taxiway at the far end of the runway.  Once the B-
757 began its take-off roll, the test van began 
crossing the runway.  The pilot was required to 
perform a rejected takeoff when either a RCA was 
issued or the aircraft reached 100 kts ground speed.  
The test van continued across the runway. 
Scenario 3 
For this scenario, the B-757 was the incurring 
vehicle and the test van was emulating an aircraft 
on departure.  The B-757 was holding at a taxiway 
at one end of the runway.  The test van began its 
“take-off” roll from the opposite end of the runway.  
Once the van reached 70 mph, the B-757 was 
cleared to cross the runway.  When a RCA was 
issued, the B-757 was to stop and the van was to 
exit the runway. 
Scenario 4 
The B-757 aircraft was landing with autoland 
engaged.  When the aircraft was approximately one 
nautical mile from the threshold, the test van 
entered the runway mid-field and began traveling 
down the runway, accelerating to 70 mph, away 
from the B-757 as if it was a departing aircraft.  The 
pilot was required to perform a go-around when 
either a RCA was issued or the aircraft reached 150 
ft. AGL.  The van exited the runway at the far end. 
Test Matrix 
The test matrix consisted of four control 
variables: subject pilot (1-4), surveillance source 
(STIS-B only (without inclusion of ADS-B in the 
data fusion) or STIS-B and ADS-B), scenario (1-4), 
and alerting algorithm used to drive the displays 
(RSM, RIAAS, GBS).  The test runs were 
conducted at night to avoid impacting DFW 
operations.  The RIPS runs were mixed with normal 
taxi operations and runs evaluating guidance to a 
hold-short point on the runway.  This was done so 
the pilots would not expect an incursion alert on 
each test run.  A total of 47 RIPS test runs were 
completed using 4 commercial B-757/B-767 
captains as test subjects.   
Data Collection 
During the testing, data was taken in several 
formats.  Subject pilots completed questionnaires to 
obtain their expert, albeit subjective, opinion of the 
system as implemented at DFW.  Also, audio/video 
recordings of all camera images and the 
experimental displays were made of each test run 
for post test review.  Finally, digital data was 
recorded onboard the B-757 and by the various 
ground systems.  All digital data was time stamped 
using the GPS time reference. 
Results 
A summary of quantitative and qualitative 
results are presented.  See the referenced reports for 
more detailed results. 
Incursion Algorithm Performance 
While completing the test matrix, data was 
collected on each of the three incursion alerting 
methods during each test run, however, only one 
method was chosen to drive the flight deck displays 
for each run.  Table 1 shows the overall 
performance of each of the alerting methods.  All of 
the missed alerts for RSM and RIAAS were a direct 
result of erroneous or missing traffic data from the 
STIS-B and/or ADS-B sources.  It should be noted 
that during the testing, RSM was scanning all traffic 
for potential conflict while RIAAS was only 
tracking the test van.  For GBS, the missed alerts 
were the result of the GBS alerting criteria and 
scenario timing.  GBS safety logic was only applied 
Presented at the 20th Digital Avionics Systems Conference, Daytona Beach, Florida, October 14-18, 2001 
 7 
to traffic that was on the runway or in its approach 
corridor, whereas, both RSM and RIAAS tracked 
traffic that had crossed the runway hold bar or  was 
in the approach corridor. 
Table 1.  Alerting Method Performance. 
  # of Runs Where Alerts 
Were Generated 
Scenario # of Runs RSM RIAAS GBS 
1 12 11 11 8 
2 11 10 11 9 
3 12 11 10 6 
4 12 11 12 11 
Total 47 43 44 34 
Missed Alerts 4 3 13 
False Alerts 4 2 9 
 
For the approach scenarios (Figure 5), 
generally the RIAAS RTA occurred a few seconds 
before the RSM alert.  Usually eight to 10 seconds 
later, the GBS alert was generated.  The RIAAS 
RCA would then occur five (Scenario 1) to 15 
(Scenario 4) seconds after that.  During the first two 
days of testing, the GBS was not generating alerts 
on the approach scenarios before the requirements 
were met to conduct the go-around maneuver.  The 
criteria was changed to expand the zone from 0.5 
nautical miles from the runway threshold to one 
nautical mile out which then resulted in generation 
of alerts.  This would suggest that at least some of 
the AMASS alerts generated for controllers do not 
occur in sufficient time to alert the flight crew and 
enable safe evasive action. 
For the departure scenarios, the RIAAS RTA 
was generated first, followed usually one to five 
seconds later by a RIAAS RCA.  The RSM alert 
was generated approximately the same time as the 
RIAAS RCA.  Finally, the GBS would alert 10 to 
20 seconds later. 
 
Figure 5.  Scenario 1 Alert Timing (from [22]) 
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From Table 1, RSM generated four false alerts 
which were caused by multiple STIS-B ownship 
position reports.  RIAAS generated 2 false alerts 
that were the result of erroneous traffic data.  GBS 
generated 9 false alerts that were mostly caused by 
a time out alert on an errant target. 
Detailed analyses of the three alerting methods 
can be found in [11], [12], [13], and, [22]. 
Navigation Subsystem Performance 
As determined in [23], at the large airports, the 
navigation system accuracy should be no worse 
than 2.2m (95% horizontal circular error probability 
(CEP)) for safe operations on the surface movement 
area in low visibility conditions.  Using the RIPS 
concept in extremely low visibility, this budget 
must account for not only the positioning system 
accuracy, but also the airport database accuracy 
(centerlines) and flight technical error (FTE).  For 
DFW, the airport database accuracy for centerline 
data was specified to be one foot (0.3m).  FTE was 
not assessed. 
For positioning system performance analysis, 
truth data was obtained by post-processing GPS 
data using a well established carrier-phase 
interferometry technique that is often used in the 
surveying practice. 
A preliminary assessment of the accuracy 
achieved suggests a 95% horizontal CEP (? ? ) of 
4.48 and 2.61 meters for WAAS and LAAS, 
respectively.  The LAAS performance was nearly 
equivalent to performance of a Special Category I 
(SCAT-1) DGPS system used during trials in 
Altanta in 1997 [4].   Detailed results can be found 
in [24].   
Availability was found to be 92.08% and 
95.05% for WAAS and LAAS respectively.  LAAS 
solutions were integrated with the INS to improve 
availability (to 98.32%), reduce variance, and 
provide the high update rate needed for display. 
Traffic Reporting Subsystem Performance 
Detailed assessment of the DFW surveillance 
system sensors, as implemented by the FAA, are 
described in [20].  Key metrics and the measured 
performance are listed in Table 2.  The performance 
shown is a representative subset of all data and was 
taken while the test aircraft was stationary. 
Table 2.  Surveillance System Performance 
ASDE-3 ATIDS Fused  
Metric ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Accuracy 
(m) 
11.09 0.07 3.00 0.22 10.75 0.21 
Update 
Rate (Hz) 
1.08 0.15 2.01 4.61 3.01 0.2 
 
As can be seen, the ATIDS outperformed the 
ASDE-3 with respect to accuracy and update rate.  
However, ATIDS did not provide complete 
coverage.  Fusion enabled full coverage and 
consistent updating, while sacrificing some of 
ATIDS accuracy.  Requirements of 12m and 1 Hz 
have been suggested in [25] for accuracy and 
update rate, respectively, for airport surface 
surveillance. 
The other component of the traffic reporting 
subsystem of RIPS is the data exchange between 
aircraft (or the test van) via ADS-B and between the 
airport facility and the aircraft via STIS-B.  The 
performance of these two links are summarized in 
Table 3. 





Update Rate 0.8 Hz 1.1 Hz 
Latency Not Available 2.8 sec 
 
In general, the ADS-B link reliability [19] was 
very good when the research aircraft was airborne.  
When both test vehicles were on the surface, 
however, performance was degraded due to line of 
sight and multipath effects.  This could be avoided 
or reduced by a more careful selection of antennas 
and antenna locations.  During the testing, both 
transponder antennas were located at the rear of the 
test van.  By placing one antenna near the front and 
one near the rear of the van, ADS-B performance 
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for scenario 3 would be greatly improved by 
eliminating the null pattern in front of the van.  
Table 4 summarizes the percentage of position 
messages received onboard the B-757 during the 
demonstration period.  The percentages shown are 
an average for two sorties conducted each 
demonstration night.  Only scenarios 1 and 3 were 
conducted during the demonstration period. 
ADS-B position messages were transmitted 
from the test van at 2 Hz.  Typically for the airborne 
scenarios, the ADS-B position messages were 
received between 2 Hz and 0.5 Hz, with most 
messages being received at 2 Hz as specified.  
When the aircraft was on the ground (particularly 
for scenario 3), however, the rate at which the 
position messages were received was very erratic, 
ranging from 2 Hz to 0.1 Hz.  This is most likely 
due to the line of sight issue. 
Although not analyzed, ADS-B latency was 
observed to be very small (<1 sec).  This was 
because ADS-B transmissions consisted of only 
encoding and decoding the message and 
propagating it over the RF channel. 
The measured performance of the traffic 
reporting technologies tested at DFW do meet many 
of the current requirements for surveillance on the 
airport surface [25].  However, this is apparently 
not sufficient for a robust runway incursion alerting 
function within RIPS.  This assessment is based on 
the observed rates of false alerts and missed 
detections.  All false alerts and missed detections at 
DFW were traced to traffic data that was inaccurate, 
inconsistent, and/or not received in a timely 
manner.  Further work will seek to establish the 
requirements for traffic reporting that are needed to 
support the incursion alerting function of RIPS. 
Table 4.  Percentage of ADS-B Position Messages 
Received On-board the Research Aircraft 
 Demo 1 Demo 2 Demo 3 
Overall 80.47 80.65 74.62 
Aircraft in air 90.80 88.08 88.79 
Aircraft on ground 69.69 68.61 57.95 
Scenario 3 47.69 43.47 37.66 
Scenario 1 91.60 93.50 89.49 
Qualitative Results 
Validating the feasibility of the system concept 
has been accomplished, in part, by obtaining 
qualitative questionnaire data and comments from 
the subject pilots during the data collection runs. 
All of the subject pilots were complimentary of 
the RIPS tested at DFW.  The pilots stated that the 
system has the potential to reduce or eliminate 
runway incursions, although human factors issues 
must still be resolved.  Several suggestions were 
made regarding the alerting symbology which will 
be incorporated into future simulation studies.  The 
audible alert was the first display to bring the pilots’ 
attention to the incursion.  The EMM would 
generally be viewed by the non-flying pilot at the 
time of an incursion since the flying pilot would 
remain heads up.  The pilots stated that two-stage 
alerting was not necessary and they would take 
action on the first alert regardless.  This may be 
related to the fact that this was a single pilot 
operation and the subject pilot did not have the 
benefit of co-pilot support.  In general, after an 
incursion alert was received, the subject pilots 
stated they would not want maneuver guidance 
during final approach or takeoff roll but would like 
guidance on whether to stop or continue when 
taxiing across a runway.  All of the pilots stated 
that, in general, the onboard alerts were generated 
in a timely manner, allowing sufficient time to react 
to the potential conflict.  They all felt safer with 
RIPS onboard. 
Summary 
The Runway Incursion Prevention system 
tested at DFW demonstrated the potential to reduce 
or eliminate runway incursions.  By providing 
supplemental guidance, surface situational 
awareness, and incursion alerts to both pilots and 
controllers, runway collisions can be prevented 
while also increasing the efficiency of airport 
surface operations. 
Lessons learned with respect to the incursion 
detection function of RIPS can be summarized by 
the following points: 
? ? It is essential that reliable, timely, and 
accurate traffic data be available to 
enable optimum onboard incursion 
detection 
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? ? Uplink of AMASS-generated alerts is not 
recommended due to the latencies 
involved and AMASS alert criteria 
? ? Further work should focus on the 
requirements for traffic information 
reporting to support the detection 
function 
Finally, the authors would like to point out that 
all equipment used during the DFW testing was 
prototype in nature.  In other words, it is likely that 
production units would perform significantly better 
than the prototype versions. 
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